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launch, this reviewer is struck by the prodigious work and expenditure that
went into developing these schemes before they were rejected.
Many books have been written about nuclear weapons and bomber air-
craft, but comparatively little attention has been given to ICBMs, and
much of that relates to the first generation ICBMs that were also used as
space launch vehicles. Works like An Untaken Road and Gretchen Heef-
ner’s The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland
(Harvard University Press, 2012), are valuable histories of this expensive
military technology. More historical work needs to be done on other as-
pects of ICBMs, notably the politically charged matter of missile defense. 
The relevance of ICBMs appeared to have ended with the Cold War,
but a generation later they have returned to the headlines. An Untaken
Road is a valuable reference for future policymakers and for those who pay
the bills for nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
CHRISTOPHER GAINOR
Christopher Gainor is the author of The Bomb and America’s Missile Age (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2018) and the editor of Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly.
Weapon of Choice: Small Arms and the Culture of Military
Innovation. 
By Matthew Ford. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
Pp. 264. Hardcover $39.95.
Matthew Ford’s densely researched volume uses small arms development
after WWII as a prism through which to understand broader processes of
western military innovation. Adopting a thoroughly constructivist per-
spective, Weapon of Choice systematically foregrounds the variety of social
actors and interests involved in the design and selection of modern rifles
and ammunition. As a sociology of military innovation, Weapon of Choice
succeeds admirably. 
The book’s first substantive chapter offers a pithy discussion of the
ways in which the study of technological change has been revolutionized
by approaches associated by the social shaping of technology. SST insights
are then applied to military innovation in the book’s subsequent chapters,
each of which focuses on successive phases of small arms development and
their main protagonists. Concentrating on soldier perspectives on their
weapons and tactics during the Second World War, Chapter 2 explores dif-
ferent understandings of the relative importance of marksmanship and
firepower, as well as the significance of social divisions within the ranks of
the Allied Armies. These factors—Ford maintains—go a long way toward
explaining why neither the American nor the British armies emerged from
the conflict with fully automatic weapons as their standard service rifles. 
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The initial impetus to develop a new assault rifle after WWII emanated
from British engineers, the focus of the book’s third chapter. Their efforts
at mediating between different constituencies and their authority-enhanc-
ing devices vis-à-vis a General Staff still wedded to the overarching impor-
tance of marksmanship to battlefield outcomes are central to Ford’s analy-
sis, which is especially noteworthy for demonstrating the engineers’ skills
in “reconfigur[ing] the user’s thinking in such a way as to avoid the sug-
gestion that engineers know better than users” (p. 55). However, since the
future balance of technical power within the emerging NATO was at stake,
British engineers came up against their American peers in the late 1940s.
With Anglo-American engineers finding themselves at loggerheads over
the question of the ammunition caliber for the prospective new automatic
rifle, the services summoned wound ballistics experts (Chapter 4). But the
findings of scientists were no less contested, socially situated, and open to
bureaucratic manipulation than those of engineers. Thus in the event, the
ultimate choice in favor of the standardization of ammunition—one which
resulted in the British Army adopting the 7.62 mm Belgian-made Fabrique
Nationale FAL in 1950s—was left to the recently reelected Churchill to
make. The main argument of Chapter 5, then, is that temporary closure for
the British politico-military establishment was achieved through a political
decision divorced from actual battlefield evidence and the opinion of
British experts. 
The Belgian company FN is central to the story told in the book’s last
substantive two chapters. Chapter 6 explores the tactics it deployed to per-
suade the whole of NATO to adopt its improved type of 5.56 mm ammu-
nition during the standardization trials of 1979–80. By so doing, it shows
that although U.S. officials had enough power to push forward their under-
standing of lethality and shape the agenda of the trials, they were not in a
position entirely to control their outcome. The final chapter of the book
discusses the 1999 adoption of the FN’s Minimi LMG by the British Army
to cast light on ongoing changes in soldier-industry relationships. Its pow-
erful conclusion is that—in the context of the privatization of the British
defense sector—arms manufacturers are finding it increasingly easy to
treat soldiers as consumers and sell their wares by appealing to the desire
for status and identity of such Special Forces as the Parachute Regiment.
Neither the privileging of elite units over the rest of the British infantry nor
the former’s increasing vulnerability to the marketing activities of manu-
facturers augurs well for the future performance and democratic account-
ability of the British armed forces as a whole. 
The insight that “weapon acquisition is as much about fashion as it is
about effectiveness” (p. 176) is not systematically developed by Ford, and
this anthropologically-minded reviewer would have welcomed a fuller dis-
cussion of the symbolic attributes with which twenty-first-century soldiers
endow their weapons. Another possible weakness of the book lies in its
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seeming lack of concern for small arms development across the Iron Cur-
tain. Surely (I found myself wondering at times) the success of the AK-47
must have played a more instrumental role in Anglo-American calcula-
tions than Ford allows? But these personal preferences and quibbles do not
detract from Ford’s achievements. As one of the few extant studies to
approach the subject of military innovation from a social constructivist
perspective—one that brings out the complexity and messiness of the
process—Weapon of Choice will no doubt attract considerable attention
and debate.
GIACOMO MACOLA
Giacomo Macola is reader in African history at the University of Kent, UK.
The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than
Others at Science and Technology. 
By Mark Zachary Taylor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Pp. 444. $29.95.
Why are some countries better than others at science and technology?
Many have asked this question in the past, mainly from a socio-cultural
and historical perspective. In contrast, Taylor’s story concentrates on the
contemporary period. He neglects the long-term factors that historians
have studied for some decades, though he does cover and criticize a large
part of the recent literature. His survey is formidable. 
What answer does Taylor offer to his question? To him, it is certainly
not market failures that explain innovation rates, contrary to what neoclas-
sical economists suggest. Neither is it domestic institutions and policies
(alone) that explain the leadership of nations, contrary to what the system
approaches pretend. Institutional explanations are “overstated and over-
simplified” (p. 23). To Taylor, it is rather politics that matters. “Most inno-
vation scholars and economists,” claims Taylor, “tend to ignore politics.
For them, politics and government are annoyances. . . . This book shows
that politics are the sine qua non for successful explanations of national
innovation rates” (p. 19). By “politics,” Taylor means threats, both domes-
tic and external. Feeling threatened by military insecurity, but also by eco-
nomic insecurity and problems such as energy, climate, and health leads to
creativity (“creative insecurity” as Taylor calls it) and acts as a force or
motive in favor of sustained support for science, technology, and innova-
tion activities.
This is a very piquant thesis that, I am sure, will be debated in the fu-
ture (another such thesis from Taylor is the detrimental effect of distribu-
tion policies on innovation activities). The insecurity thesis has some fac-
tual evidence, as Taylor attempts to demonstrate. It also has, if I may add,
some foundation in the discourses supporting the development of policies
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